This study examines the consequences of the series of reforms targeting investmentbanking-related conflicts of interest. We compare and contrast optimism biases in analysts' stock recommendations, but not their earnings forecasts. Moreover, we find little change in the profitability of their stock recommendations, but detect a drop in the accuracy of earnings forecasts made by investment bank analysts. In sum, the reforms achieve the objective of mitigating the apparent optimism in investment bank stock recommendations, but they do not provide benefit to investors in terms of more profitable recommendations or more accurate earnings forecasts.
In this paper, we examine the impact of the reforms on investment bank analysts' research biases. If the reforms resolve investment banking-related conflicts of interest, we expect to find a reduction in investment bank analysts' research biases in the post-reform period, ceteris paribus.
We conduct our tests on analysts from different type of securities firms (research firms, brokerage firms, syndicate banks, and investment banks) and we also separate investment banks into non-sanctioned and sanctioned banks to examine the incremental effect of the Global Settlement. 1 We examine the change in analysts' research biases between the pre-reform period (January 1998 -December 2001 and post-reform period (January 2004 -December 2007 .
We document two key results. First, we find a significant reduction in the relative optimism of sanctioned bank stock recommendations, but no change in the relative optimism of their earnings forecasts. 2 Second, we show that sanctioned bank analysts become significantly less optimistic than research firm analysts in the post-reform period. These findings are consistent with the reforms reducing the optimism of stock recommendations issued by analysts from sanctioned investment banks. This eases the concern that the reforms might induce other biases to investment bank research as their incentive has shifted from gaining investment banking businesses to generating trading commissions.
1 An alternative way to capture investment-banking incentives is to divide investment bank analysts into affiliated and nonaffiliated analysts. However, nonaffiliated analysts also have incentive to bias their research to help their banks attract future investment banking business (e.g., Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter [2007] ). Since the reforms target all investment banks, we believe that our partitioning is the appropriate one for addressing our research questions. Prior studies using the affiliation classification have found mixed results. In particular, Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Lin and McNichols (1998) , Michaely and Womack (1999) , and Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) find that affiliated analysts make more optimistic earnings growth forecasts and more favorable recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. Michaely and Womack (1999) also find that the stock recommendations of affiliated analysts underperform those of unaffiliated analysts for a sample of IPO firms. However, Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Lin and McNichols (1998), and McNichols, O'Brien, and Pamukcu (2007) find no statistical difference in the profitability of buy recommendations issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. 2 The different outcomes could be due to the fact that the reforms focus on optimistic stock recommendations, and earnings forecasts are seldom mentioned in any of the legislations.
There are reasons to believe, however, that the reforms have unintended consequences on the quality of research. First, Mehran and Stulz (2007) argue that if investment bank analysts provide better research as a consequence of the conflicts, the consumers of this research will benefit. Moreover, these conflicts impose deadweight costs on investment banks because their customers take the conflicts into account and, hence, investment banks already have incentives to reduce these conflicts and the associated costs. Any regulation might simply replace these deadweight costs with regulatory costs. Second, without funding provided by investment banking businesses, research departments might have to reduce their coverage or the quality of their research (e.g., Boni and Womack [2002] ; Boni [2006] ; O'Leary [2007] ) and elite analysts might leave sell-side research to pursue other lucrative opportunities (e.g., Institutional Investor [2007] ; Groysberg, Healy and Chapman [2008] ; Pizzani [2009] ; Guan, Lu and Wong [2010] ).
Third, participation of equity analysts in investment banking deals helps analysts become more familiar with the companies and their industries (e.g., Institutional Investor [2007] ; Jacob, Rock, and Weber [2008] ; Mehran and Stulz [2007] ; Pizzani [2009] ). Hence, separating research from investment banking activities may reduce the quality of investment research.
Consistent with these arguments, we document that sanctioned bank buy recommendations become less profitable, while the profitability of sell/hold recommendations improves insignificantly. Moreover, the accuracy of investment bank forecasts drops. These results are consistent with the reforms providing little incremental benefit to investors in terms of more profitable recommendations or more accurate forecasts (Mehran and Stulz [2007] ; Kim [2009] ).
3
These findings also call into question the efficacy of a Global Settlement requirement that sanctioned banks furnish third-party independent research to their retail clients. This is because research firms are more optimistic in their earnings forecasts and recommendations in the postreform period. Moreover, the accuracy of their forecasts and the profitability of their recommendations are not significantly different from those of investment banks after the reforms. 4 This study adds to the strand of literature examining investment banking-related conflicts of interest as the cause of the research biases in various pre-reform periods (e.g., see Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau [2004] ; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy [2006] ; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan [2007] ; Agrawal and Chen [2008] ; Jacob, Rock, and Weber [2008] ). In general, these studies find mixed evidence that investment banks issued more optimistic forecasts or recommendations than non-investment banks (see Mehran and Stulz [2007] for a summary). We use the reforms as a unique setting to shed further light on this issue. In particular, if investment bank analysts were biased because of conflicts of interest, their banks would take actions to alleviate the biases in response to the reforms. The larger the incentive problem in the pre-reform period, the bigger will be the reduction in analysts' optimistic biases as a result of the mitigating actions taken by the banks. We document that the reduction in the relative recommendation optimism of sanctioned bank analysts is larger than that of their research firm counterparts, which is consistent with sanctioned investment bank analysts being optimistically biased in the pre-reform period and reacting to the reforms swiftly as a result.
This study also adds to Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman. (2006) and Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach [2009] , which investigate the effect of the reforms on the properties of stock recommendations using a post-reform period ending in June 2003 and December 2004, respectively. Our tests supplement these two studies by examining the long-term effect of the reforms using a longer post-reform period: from January 2004 through December 2007 (Mehran and Stulz [2007] ). Moreover, as discussed below in section 5.1, our research design is different from the research designs of these two studies and, hence, provides triangulating evidence on the economic consequences of the reforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the series of reforms.
Section 3 describes the sample and data, while section 4 explains our research design. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results on stock recommendations and earnings forecasts, respectively, and section 7 provides concluding remarks.
Reforms on Analyst Conflicts of Interest
Equity research analysts play an important role as information intermediaries. They help investors make investment decisions and improve the informational efficiency of the stock markets. However, concerns exist about the objectivity of analyst research. In particular, analysts are accused of hyping stocks to secure management access, to generate brokerage commissions, or to attract investment-banking business. As a result, the financial industry, self-regulatory organizations (SROs), and regulators introduced proposals or rules to restore public confidence in the independence of research analysts and objectivity of analyst research.
Recognizing the conflicts of interests in equity research, the Securities Industry Association endorsed a compilation of "best practices" in June 2000. These practices recommend the following guidelines: Research departments should not report to investment banking units;
analysts' compensation should not be tied to investment banking business; firms should disclose analysts' financial interests; and analysts should not trade contrary to their recommendations. Research management makes all decisions to initiate or terminate the coverage of companies.
Second, sanctioned banks must contract with at least three independent research firms that will furnish independent research to the banks' research clients for a five-year period. Last but not least, these banks must publicly disclose their research analysts' historical ratings and pricetarget forecasts to assist investors in evaluating the performance of analysts.
Sample and Data
Our sample of analysts comes from Thomson Financial's I/B/E/S database and covers the period from January 1998 to December 2007. We divide the sample into three subperiods: The pre-reform period (January 1998 -December 2001 , the transition period (January 2002 -December 2003 , and the post-reform period (January 2004 -December 2007 . We examine the change in analysts' research biases between the pre-and post-reform periods. We exclude the transition period from the analysis because it is the period when the reforms were proposed, deliberated, and implemented. Since the regulatory environment underwent continual changes during the transition period, including this period in our analysis could potentially have induced "background noise" in estimating the permanent effect of the reforms on analysts' research biases.
We retrieve all analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations from the I/B/E/S The final sample consists of those analysts who make both stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. The sample is further subject to two additional restrictions to facilitate the calculation of the analyst-specific relative research bias measures. First, we compute these measures using only company-year observations that are followed by at least three analysts.
Second, we calculate these measures using companies that are covered by at least one research firm analyst and one investment bank analyst in a particular forecasting period. The latter restriction is done to ensure a fair comparison of the research biases of research firm analysts with those of their investment bank counterparts. In particular, it rules out the possibility that difference in coverage is driving the difference in the research biases of these two types of analysts (we further control for the difference in the portfolio of companies covered by analysts in subsequent regression analysis). While this restriction reduces the number of company-years 8 Lead or co-lead underwriters (or book runners) are chosen by the issuers (IPO or SEO companies) to handle all aspects of the equity offerings, including pricing, marketing, and distributing. The managers or co-managers are selected by the lead or co-lead underwriters to facilitate distribution of the offering. See Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009) . 9 If an analyst changes jobs from one firm type to another, we assign her to the firm type of her original employer in the switching year. The results (not tabulated) are robust if we exclude these analysts from our sample.
used in the computation of these measures, the results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged if we do not impose this restriction.
10 Table 1 reports the number of analysts in the sample, the number of securities firms represented by these analysts, and the number of companies included in the computation of analyst-specific relative bias measures. Consistent with prior studies, Panel A shows that the majority of the analysts in our sample come from investment banks (both sanctioned and nonsanctioned banks). The number of analysts increases from the pre-reform period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) represented by our sample of analysts. The number of securities firms also goes up in the postreform period, especially the number of research firms, which could be due to the funding for independent research provided by the Global Settlement. Panel C reports the number of companies used in the computation of analyst-specific relative bias measures. To be included in the sample, a company must be followed by at least three analysts, including one research firm analyst and one investment bank analyst. The number of companies increases sharply from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period, which is likely due to the increase in the number of research firm analysts in the post-reform period: hence, more companies meet the sample inclusion restrictions.
[Insert table 1 about here]
Model Specification, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics
We use the difference-in-differences (DD) method to investigate the impact of the reforms on the biases of analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. In the DD analysis, we compare the change in the biases of research firm analysts to those of analysts from different types of securities firms (brokerage firms, syndicate banks, non-sanctioned and sanctioned investment banks). The DD method explicitly controls for time-specific variations that are common across the groups, but not attributed to the reforms per se (i.e., confounding effects).
We also control for other sources of variations in research biases across analysts and sample period in the DD regression model, which is specified as follows:
where DEP is a measure of analyst i's research biases (to be defined in sections 5 and 6). D is an indicator variable that equals one in the post-reform period and zero in the pre-reform period.
BROKERAGE, SYNDICATE, NONSANC, and SANCTIONED are indicator variables that equal
one, respectively, if analyst i is employed by a brokerage firm, syndicate firm, non-sanctioned investment bank, and a sanctioned investment bank; and zero otherwise.
The estimated coefficients  2 to  5 represent the pre-reform research biases of brokerage, syndicate, non-sanctioned investment, and sanctioned investment firm analysts, respectively, relative to that of research firm analysts. The estimated coefficients  6 to  9 are the differencein-differences estimates, indicating the changes in the biases of analysts from brokerage firms, syndicate firms, non-sanctioned and sanctioned investment banks, respectively, relative to the change in the bias of research firm analysts.
We estimate the DD regression model using the ordinary least square method on a panel of analysts. Hence, we include year-dummy variables to control for unobserved time effects, and we cluster by analyst to absorb unobserved analyst effects. Petersen (2009) shows that if the time effect is fixed, this approach will produce unbiased standard errors. Given the short time series, we are not able to cluster on both year and analyst or to formally model the time dependence.
Since the unit of analysis is analyst-year, we further control for variations across analysts and over time in the DD regression. In particular, we control for the characteristics of the analysts, the brokerage firms in which they work, and the portfolio of companies they covered.
We rely on prior studies (e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale [1999] ; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis [1999] ; Hong and Kubik [2003] ; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan [2006] ) to identify the set of variables that have shown to be associated with analyst optimism and accuracy. We discuss these variables next.
Analyst characteristics are captured by analyst experience, number of companies followed, analyst industry specialization, analyst turnover indicator, and percent of new followings.
Analyst experience is the average number of years the analyst has issued earnings forecasts or recommendations for the companies they follow. Number of companies followed is the number of companies for which the analyst provides earnings forecasts in a corresponding calendar year.
Analyst specialization is the average percentage of companies followed by the analyst with the same two-digit SIC code as each company being followed. The denominator is the total number of firms followed by the analyst in the sample period 1998-2007. Analyst turnover is an indicator variable that equals one in the year when the analyst left the brokerage house where she worked last year; otherwise, it equals to zero. Percent of new following is the percentage of companies that the analyst covers in the current year that are not being covered in the previous year.
Brokerage firm characteristics are captured by brokerage firms' size rank and specialization. Brokerage firm size rank is the percentile ranking of the total number of analysts employed by the brokerage house to which the analyst belongs, relative to other brokerage houses. Brokerage specialization is the percentage of the analyst's brokerage house analysts who follow company j's industry.
Portfolio characteristics are captured by the average company size, leverage, gross margin, sales growth, book-to-market ratio, and amount of external financing of the portfolio of companies being followed by the analyst. Company size is the logarithm of the market value of equity. Leverage is the debt-to-equity ratio. Gross margin is equal to one minus the cost of goods sold scaled by total sales. Sales growth is the growth in total net sales. Book-to-market is the book-to-market ratio. The amount of external financing is the net amount of cash flow received from external financing activities scaled by average total assets.
Finally, we also control for forecast horizon and lagged relative earnings forecast accuracy in the regressions. Forecast horizon is the average number of days between the forecast date and the forecast period end date for the portfolio of companies followed by an analyst. Following Hong and Kubik (2003) 
Rank is analyst i's forecast accuracy rank for company j in fiscal year t, and jt NumberFollowing is the number of analysts following company j in fiscal year t. We use the last forecast made by each analyst for the same company and forecast period (FY1 -the current fiscal year). By construction, this measure controls for difference in the composition of companies followed by the analysts. Table 2 presents statistics on the control variables that we include in the DD regressions.
The statistics indicate that research firm analysts have less experience than their counterparts at investment banks and, on average, follow fewer companies and have more new following than investment bank analysts. On the other hand, investment bank analysts have higher industry specialization and lower job turnover than other analysts. They also tend to follow companies that are larger, more leveraged, and more profitable than those followed by research firm analysts. Besides the cross-sectional variations, these characteristics also vary across the two subperiods. The variations across analysts and over time could potentially affect the relative change in analysts' research bias over the pre-and post-reform periods and, hence, we control for these sources of variations in the DD regressions.
[Insert Clement (1999) and others in that it accounts for difference in the portfolio of companies followed by different analysts and for time effect. Table 3 , Panel A presents the levels and changes in relative stock recommendation optimism, RROPT, by subperiod and analyst affiliation. In both the pre-and post-reform periods, investment bank analysts are relatively less optimistic than research firms. For example, the average RROPT for sanctioned bank analysts is -0.071 in the post-reform period, compared with 0.059 for research firm analysts. On the other hand, columns (3) and (4) show that analysts from syndicate firms and non-sanctioned banks exhibit a significant increase in RROPT after the reforms. However, the increases are not significantly different from that of research firm analysts, as shown in columns 7 and 8. In contrast, sanctioned bank analysts become less 11 For example, assume analyst i follows a company with a hold recommendation. There are nine other analysts following the same company and their recommendations are 3 buys, 4 holds, and 2 sells. LessPOS and LessNEG will be 30% and 20%, respectively, for analyst i. If one of these analysts downgrades from a hold to a sell, analyst i's LessPOS and LessNEG will change to 30% and 30%, respectively. In other words, analyst i becomes relatively less negative (i.e., LessNEG increases), since one more analyst has a more unfavorable recommendation than her; LessPOS remains unchanged, however. If another analyst upgrades from a sell to a buy, analyst i's LessPOS and LessNEG will change to 40% and 20%, respectively. In other words, analyst i becomes both relatively less positive (i.e., LessPOS increases) and more negative (i.e., LessNEG decreases).
optimistic after the reform (RROPT decreases by 0.056) and column (9) indicates that the drop is significantly different from that of research firm analysts.
To better understand the drop in the relative recommendation optimism of sanctioned banks, we examine its two components, LessPOS and LessNEG. Column (5) Next, we turn to a multivariate analysis of the effect of the reform on analysts' relative recommendation optimism. We use a difference-in-differences (DD) regression model to control for other sources of variations that could affect the relative recommendation optimism of analysts from different firm types.
[Insert table 4 about here] Table 4 summarizes the difference-in-differences regressions of RROPT and its two components. In the RROPT regression, the estimated coefficients on BROKERAGE, SYNDICATE, NONSANC, and SANCTIONED are not distinguishable from zero, indicating that there is no difference in the level of relative recommendation optimism between research firms and other firm types before the reforms. However, the estimated coefficient on D×SANCTIONED (i.e., the difference-in-differences estimate) is significantly negative at the 5% level (t=-2.44), indicating that the reforms have a significant negative effect on the optimism of stock recommendations made by sanctioned bank analysts. The DD estimates for other analysts are indistinguishable from zero and, hence, there is no evidence that analyst from other firm types are changing their recommendation optimism in response to the reforms. RROPT. Specifically, analysts who followed more firms and those who followed more new firms are less optimistic in their recommendations, as are analysts from large securities firms and from firms with specific industry expertise. Analysts who cover large companies and high-growth companies (i.e., low book-to-market ratio) are also less optimistic in their stock recommendations.
As for the two components of RROPT, the last two sets of columns in analysts who follow the same companies. Hence, sanctioned bank analysts were not only less optimistic than their non-sanctioned bank counterparts, but also less optimistic than analysts from syndicate, brokerage, and research firms. Second, we report a relative, instead of an absolute, optimism metric. 13 The use of the relative optimism metric rules out the possibility that the percentage of buys issued by sanctioned banks drops much more than that of non-sanctioned banks, because they follow different companies and these companies are affected differently by 12 In their review of the extant literature, Mehran and Stulz (2007) point out that "some of the effects of these [conflicts-of-interest] regulations might not be noticeable with such a short sample period" (p. 292). Our tests supplement these two studies by examining a longer post-reform sample period. Moreover, our research design is different from those of these two studies and, hence, our study provides triangulating evidence on the economic consequences of the reforms. 13 In sensitivity tests, we find that the results are robust when we use an absolute optimism measure.
the market downturn around the implementation of NASD 2711. Third, we examine optimism bias at the analyst level, instead of at the bank level. This allows us to control for both crosssectional and time-series differences in analyst characteristics in our regression analysis. Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) One way to address this issue is to examine the impact of the reforms on the profitability of analyst recommendations, which we turn to next.
Profitability of Stock Recommendation
14 Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) find that many securities firms moved from a five-tier stock rating system to a three-tier system in 2002. All post-2006 I/B/E/S data tapes include retrospective changes to brokers' alterations of their recommendation scales (Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston [2009] ). Since we use the 2008 I/B/E/S data, our results are not affected by the change in the stock rating system.
To address whether the reforms have any economic consequence on stock recommendations, we compare and contrast the profitability of recommendations in the pre-and post-reform periods. We compute the profitability of stock recommendations using the methodology of Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) , except that we form trading portfolios at the analyst level instead of at the securities firm level. Specifically, we classify the upgrades to buy or strong buy, initiations, resumptions, and reiterations of coverage with a buy or strong buy rating into a buy portfolio. A stock enters the buy portfolio on the date when the recommendation is issued. The stock leaves the portfolio either on the day before the next downgraded recommendation or after 255 trading days following the initial recommendation, whichever comes first. The hold/sell portfolio is constructed similarly. Each portfolio consists of all the companies an analyst follows and is updated daily. Daily abnormal return is the alpha from the estimation of the Fama-French three factors plus the Carhart momentum factor regression model (Fama and French[1993] ; Carhart[1997] ), estimated by analyst and over the pre-and post-reform periods.
[Insert table 5 about here] Table 5 summarizes the findings. Panel A shows that average daily abnormal returns for the buy portfolios of research firm analysts drop from 4.5 basis points before the reforms to 2.1 basis points after the reforms, but the change is indistinguishable from zero. Similarly, we also see a drop in the recommendation profitability for brokerage and syndicate firm analysts, although not significantly so. On the other hand, the changes for both non-sanctioned and sanctioned investment bank analysts are significantly negative. However, the drop in the profitability of investment bank recommendations is not significantly different from that of research firms, as shown in columns (8) and (9).
Panel B reports the results for the hold/sell portfolio. It indicates that after the reforms, average abnormal returns of hold/sell recommendations made by all types of analysts decrease (i.e., it become more profitable), with such decreases being statistically significant for analysts from research firms, brokerage firms, and non-sanctioned banks. The statistics in columns (6) to (9) show that the changes are not statistically different from those of research firms.
In section 5.1, we find that sanctioned bank analysts become relatively less positive and more negative in their recommendations after the reforms. Hence, the shift in the distribution of their recommendations implies that their buy recommendations should become more profitable, while their sells should become less profitable. 15 However, Table 5 , column (5) shows that the average change in the profitability of buys for sanctioned bank analysts is significantly negative while that of sells is insignificantly different from zero. This finding leads us to conclude that, while the reforms reduce the optimism of sanctioned bank analysts' recommendations, the reduction does not lead to improvement in the profitability of their recommendations.
Our pre-reform period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) 
Robustness Checks
This subsection includes a series of sensitivity analyses using the same difference-in differences research design. Second, the composition of our sample changes over time: analysts switch employers; new analysts enter the industry; old analysts exit the industry; and research firms, brokers, and banks 16 We thank the referee for suggesting these robustness checks. 17 The recommendation level is defined in such a way that the sign on the difference-in-differences estimators is identical to that in Table 4 (relative recommendation optimism).
are added to and dropped from the I/B/E/S database. As a result, the characteristics of the analysts, the firms they work for, and the companies they follow are changing during the sample period. We have already controlled for these sources of variation in the difference-in-differences regression. As a robustness check, we redo our tests using a sample of analysts who are present in both the pre-and post-reforms periods. We lose two-thirds of our analysts due to this strict constraint. Untabulated results show that the original result on the interaction term DSANCTIONED in the RROPT regression is no longer statistically significant; the qualitative results for the LessPOS and LessNEG regressions remain unchanged. Since the constraint leads to a significant reduction in sample size, survivorship bias could become a problem in this sensitivity analysis. We believe that our original sample is more representative of the general population of analysts. 
Empirical Findings on Earnings Forecasts

Relative Forecast Optimism
We estimate the relative forecast optimism measures following Clement (1999) and others. (9) shows that the change in the relative forecast optimism of sanctioned bank analysts is statistically more negative than that of their research firm counterparts. Table 8 summarizes the difference-in-differences regression results. In the relative forecast optimism regression, none of the difference-in-differences estimates (i.e., those on the interaction terms) are statistically different from zero. This result indicates that the changes in relative forecast optimism around the reforms are not significantly different between research 20 The sample used in this section is the same as that used in the stock recommendation tests. If we do not restrict the sample here to have stock recommendation data, the sample size will increase from 11,201 to 18,918. The results (not tabulated) based on the larger sample are more significant, but qualitatively similar, to those reported in the table.
firm analysts and their investment bank counterparts. In other words, we do not observe any significant change in the incentives of analysts making optimistic earnings forecasts across different firm types. As for the control variables, the results indicate that analysts who experience high turnover and cover many new companies are relatively more optimistic.
In sum, we document evidence consistent with the reforms having no statistical effect on the relative forecast optimism of investment bank analysts. This is in contrast to what we find for stock recommendations. The fact that securities regulators focus their attention on stock recommendations rather than earnings forecasts might explain these results. In other words, sanctioned investment banks reduce their stock recommendation optimism in response to the reforms, but leave their earnings forecasts optimism unchanged, partly because earnings forecasts are not the focus of the reform.
Relative Forecast Accuracy
We next examine the consequence of the reforms on the accuracy of analysts' forecasts.
The calculation of relative forecast accuracy is given in section 4.
Panel B in table 7 shows striking results. First, the initial row of the panel indicates that in the pre-reform period, the forecasts of brokerage, syndicate, non-sanctioned, and sanctioned firms are more accurate than those of research firms. Second, the accuracy of research firm analysts improves after the reforms. In contrast, sanctioned and non-sanctioned investment bank analysts become significantly less accurate after the reforms, although they are still statistically more accurate than their research bank counterparts in the post-reform period (as shown in columns 8 and 9).
The multivariate result for relative forecast accuracy is given in the last set of columns in table 8. The estimated coefficients on NONSANC and SANCTIONED are statistically positive, indicating that the earnings forecasts made by analysts from non-sanctioned and sanctioned investment banks are relatively more accurate than those made by analysts from research firms in the pre-reform period. On the contrary, the difference-in-differences estimate is significantly negative for sanctioned banks only. This is consistent with the reforms having a differential impact on the accuracy of research firm and sanctioned investment bank analysts.
In summary, the reforms targeting investment bank analysts have negatively affected the forecast accuracy of investment bank analysts and unexpectedly improves the accuracy of research firm analysts. The former might be due to the fact that investment bank research departments lose their funding from investment banking businesses. The latter might be attributed to the fact that the Global Settlement provides $432.5 million to support independent analyst research. Indeed, the statistics in table 2 show that research firm analysts cover fewer companies and experience less turnover after the reforms. As a result, the accuracy of sanctioned investment bank analysts is no longer significantly better than their research firm counterparts after the reforms.
Robustness Checks
We conduct three sets of sensitivity analyses. We repeat our analysis including only year 2001 in the pre-reform period. Our results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that the conflicts-of-interest reforms, not
Reg FD, are associated with our findings.
Second, we examine relative forecast optimism and relative forecast accuracy in our main tests because they control for firm-specific effects (Clement [1999] ; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy [2006] ). Nevertheless, it is important to know whether our conclusions are sensitive to the use of the relative measures. When we use absolute forecast optimism and absolute forecast accuracy as the dependent variables in the DD regressions, our original results are robust.
Furthermore, most of the control variables exhibit significant explanatory power for analysts' absolute optimism and absolute accuracy.
Third, as in section 5.3, we repeat our analysis on a sample of analysts who were present in both the pre-and post-reforms periods. Untabulated results indicate that our original findings on the effect of the reforms on earnings forecast optimism and accuracy are robust to the imposition of this sample restriction.
Finally, if we cluster standard errors at the securities firm level, the significance level of the estimated coefficients on DSANCTIONED remains unchanged.
Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the consequences of a series of reforms that aim at resolving analyst conflicts of interest driven by the investment banking business. We conduct our tests on analysts from different types of securities firms: research firms, brokerage firms, syndicate banks, nonsanctioned investment banks, and sanctioned investment banks. We use securities firm type to capture the level of investment banking-related conflicts of interest facing the analysts. We We find a significant reduction in the relative optimism of stock recommendations, but no significant change in the relative optimism of earnings forecasts made by sanctioned investment bank analysts. We also document that the accuracy of investment bank forecasts drops and the profitability of its stock recommendations remains unchanged after the reforms.
Taken together, our evidence from an investigation of the four-year-long post-reform period suggests that while the conflict-of-interest reforms reduce the optimism of stock recommendations issued by sanctioned investment bank analysts, the reforms also have an unintended negative consequence: Specifically, investors do not gain economic benefits from the less pessimistic stock recommendations, while they receive less accurate earnings forecasts.
It should be noted that we capture the level of analysts' conflicts of interest using the type of securities firms and, hence, we do not test whether affiliated investment bank analysts are more biased than their nonaffiliated counterparts. In a related study, Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) by showing that sanctioned bank analysts become less optimistic than other analysts (not just affiliated analysts) who follow the same companies. In contrast to their results, we also document that sanctioned bank analysts are issuing more pessimistic recommendations relative to other analysts who follow the same companies. 
(2)-(1)
(3)- (1) (8)
(5)-(1) 
  where the dependent variable, DEP, is RROPT, LessPOS, or LessNEG. RROPT is relative recommendation optimism for each analyst, computed as LessNEG minus LessPOS. LessPOS (LessNEG) stands for less positive (less negative) and is the percentage of other analysts' recommendations for the same company in the same period that are more (less) favorable than the analyst's recommendation. The dependent variables are multiplied by 100. D is an indicator variable that equals to one in the post-reform period (January 2004 -December 2007 , and zero in the pre-reform period (January 1998 -December 2001 . BROKERAGE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from brokerage firms, and zero otherwise. SYNDICATE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from syndicate firms, and zero otherwise. NONSANC is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from non-sanctioned full-service investment banks, and zero otherwise. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from sanctioned full-service investment banks, and zero otherwise. CONTROLS represents a set of control variables for analyst, firm, and portfolio characteristics, which are defined in section 4. Year fixed effects are also included. Robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. *, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-sided t-test. 
  where the dependent variable, DEP, is either average recommendation level or average adjusted recommendation level. Average recommendation level is the average of all stock recommendations made by an analyst in a particular year. Average adjusted recommendation level is the average of all stock recommendations made by an analyst minus the average of all the recommendations made by other analysts who follow the same companies. The dependent variables are multiplied by 100. D is an indicator variable that equals to one in the post-reform period (January 2004 -December 2007 , and zero in the prereform period (January 1998 -December 2001 . BROKERAGE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from brokerage firms, and zero otherwise. SYNDICATE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from syndicate firms, and zero otherwise. NONSANC is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from non-sanctioned fullservice investment banks, and zero otherwise. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from sanctioned full-service investment banks, and zero otherwise. CONTROLS represents a set of control variables for analyst, firm, and portfolio characteristics, which are defined in section 4. Year fixed effects are also included. Robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. *, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-sided t-test.
(Continued) 
(3)-(1) Forecast optimism is forecasted earnings minus actual earnings, scaled by the standard deviation of all forecasts for the same company. Forecast optimism is multiplied by 100. Relative forecast accuracy is forecast accuracy rank for all companies followed by an analyst. D is an indicator variable that equals to one in the post-reform period (January 2004 -December 2007 , and zero in the pre-reform period (January 1998 -December 2001 . BROKERAGE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from brokerage firms, and zero otherwise. SYNDICATE is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from syndicate firms, and zero otherwise. NONSANC is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from non-sanctioned full-service investment banks, and zero otherwise. SANCTIONED is an indicator variable that equals to one for analysts from sanctioned full-service investment banks, and zero otherwise. CONTROLS represents a set of control variables for analyst, firm, and portfolio characteristics, which are defined in section 4. Year fixed effects are also included. Robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. *, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level using a two-sided t-test. 
